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The False Claims Act: A Consumer's
Tool to Combat Fraud Against the
Government
Thomas Grande
"The sad truth is that crime against the Government often does pay. 1
Consumers have many tools available to effectuate
positive changes in public policy. Most of these tools
involve indirect means such as public education, legislative lobbying, lawsuits challenging inappropriate public
and private action. There are some state and federal
statutes that allow the consumer to assume the role of
private attorney general to enforce statutory violations.
Most statutes that authorize a private right of enforce3
ment, such as the Clean Water Act 2 and the Clayton Act,
have a significant limitation, however. These types of
statutes create private causes of action only for persons
who have standing to bring them, mostly those who are
directly aggrieved or harmed in some way by the private
or public wrongdoing.
Unlike almost all other federal fraud statutes or
common law causes of action,4 the False Claims Act, with
its unique qui tam provisions, allows individuals to file
and prosecute a lawsuit in the name of the United States.
The False Claims Act offers a tremendous opportunity for
consumers to effectuate significant public policy change
by authorizing suits even if the plaintiff has suffered no
direct harm.
The False Claims Act empowers individuals and
organizations with knowledge of private fraud against
the government. Its express intent is to encourage qui tam
suits by giving consumers the tools and incentive to
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represent the government in actions against individuals
and organizations who falsely bill for services not rendered or goods not delivered.
Although the roots of the False Claims Act extend
beyond its Civil War origins, in the past thirteen years it
has become one of the most valuable tools available to
private citizens in combating fraud against the government. Its future use is certain to generate significant
private policy changes in the manner in which organizations seek payment of government funds. It will likewise
generate significant public policy changes in the way
those organizations are subject to liability for falsely
billing the government and falsely obtaining government
moneys.
FALSE CLAIMS ACT ORIGINATED IN CIVIL WAR
The False Claims Act5 was originally known as the
"Informer's Act" or the "Lincoln Law." It was enacted
during the height of the Civil War at the urging of President Abraham Lincoln when dramatically increased
government spending on military procurement led to
widespread fraud by private contractors.6 The most
glaring examples of fraud included the following: sawdust sold as munitions and transported to Union soldiers; supplies such as horses and mules sold to units of
the Union cavalry and then resold to other units; and
unseaworthy ships freshly painted and delivered to the
Navy as newly built.7
By 1863, the fraud and profiteering in military
supplies for the Union Army severely imperiled the
Union war effort. In Lincoln's words, "[Wiorse than
traitors in arms are the men who pretend loyalty to the
flag, feast and fatten on the misfortunes of the Nation
while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of the
South and their countrymen are moldering in the dust."8
Unfortunately, in the 1860s, there were no federal law
enforcement agencies (such as a centralized Department
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of Justice or Federal Bureau of Investigation) to spearhead the enforcement effort. This situation left the United
States - and the Union Army - with neither the tools nor
the institutional mechanism to combat the fraud that the
President viewed as threatening the very existence of the
United States. 9 In response to President Lincoln's concerns, Congress enacted the False Claims Act of 1863,
which the President immediately signed into law.10
One of the most important parts of the False
Claims Act of 1863 allowed private qui tam informers to
initiate fraud actions against government suppliers and
contractors on behalf of the United States. Qui tam is the
abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means, "who
sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself.""
Qui tam statutes are well-established in English
jurisprudence 12 and were long considered a legitimate
private means of enforcing public law. At the time of the
False Claims Act's passage in 1863, numerous other qui
tam statutes had been codified by the federal and state
governments. In fact, ten of the first fourteen statutes
enacted by the first United States Congress relied on qui
tam actions to aid the police enforcement role of govern3
ment agencies.
Under the 1863 Act, persons found liable of
fraudulently billing the government were fined an
amount equal to twice the damages caused by the false
claim and were required to remit a $2,000 civil penalty
for each false claim submitted to the United States. 4 The
individual who filed suit on behalf of the government,
the "relator," received 50% of all monies recovered as
well as reimbursement of costs of suit from the defendant.' s
CONGRESS ADJUSTED ACT FOR MODERN CONDITIONS
After the Civil War, the False Claims Act fell into
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disuse. During the 1930s and 1940s, following enactment
of the New Deal and the military build-up prior to World
War II, expansion of the government's economic role
provided new opportunities for private contractors to
profit through fraud. 16 However, because of what was
perceived to be an abuse of the system by relators who
had no direct knowledge of the fraud, yet were able to
recover monies under the Act after a public disclosure of
a government criminal investigation, amendments were
made in 1943 which restricted the statute. The 1943
amendments prohibited a qui tam recovery where there
was any prior government knowledge of the false billing.
The 1943 amendments also gave the government discretion to award nothing to the qui tam relator and reduced
the maximum amount the relator could obtain to 25%. 11
The effects of these changes limited the availability of qui
tam as a means of eliminating government fraud and
reducee the incentives for private individuals to file qui
tam actions. Although these changes effectively restricted
the False Claims Act's availability to private litigants,
there were a few cases brought under the 1943 amendments. 18
After passage of the 1943 amendments, another
period of relative disuse followed. However, the number
of filings of False Claims Act complaints increased dramatically after 1986, when Congress liberalized some of
its provisions making it easier to bring lawsuits under the
Act and increasing the incentives for relators to pursue
False Claims Act lawsuits.
RAMPANT DEFENSE INDUSTRY FRAUD PROMPTS
FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act
were prompted in large measure by increasing congressional concern over rampant fraud, particularly in the
defense industry.19 Just as the Civil War and pre-World
War II military build-ups presented defense contractors
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with increased opportunities to profit from false billings,
the dramatic increase in military spending after 1980
again created the climate for government contractors to
steal from the government. °
During this time period, Congress was increasingly confronted with reports of fraud and fraudulent
billings that permeated virtually every government
program. 21 For example, in 1985 the Department of
Defense Inspector General reported that nine of the top
ten defense contractors were under investigation for
multiple fraud offenses, including four of the largest
which were later convicted of criminal offenses against
the government. 22 Public money lost to fraud ranged
from hundreds of millions of dollars to $50 billion per
year.23
In considering amendments to the False Claims
Act, Congress recognized that "the most serious problem
plaguing effective enforcement [of federal anti-fraud
laws] is a lack of resources on the part of Federal enforcement agencies." 24 Congressional leaders thus acknowledged that in many instances the government's enforcement team was overmatched by the legal teams retained
by major contractors. Faced with this untenable situation,
Congress took action by strengthening private enforcement tools to supplement inadequate government action
and specifically sought to increase the number of qui tam
filings to achieve this goal:
The Committee believes that the amendments in S. 1562 which allow and encourage assistance from the private citizenry
can make a significant impact on bolstering
the Government's fraud enforcement effort.25
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1986 AMENDMENTS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
STRENGTHEN THE STATUTE
The 1986 amendments were passed with bi-partisan sponsorship and support.26 Although the Department of Justice supported strengthening the False Claims
Act, it opposed any changes to the qui tam provisions of
the False Claims Act.27 President Ronald Reagan - like
his Republican counterpart one hundred and twenty
years earlier - approved the amendments and apparently
recognized the need for liberalizing the qui tam provisions to combat fraud committed against the government.
The 1986 amendments strengthened the False
Claims Act in several different areas. Taken as a whole,
the changes were designed to accomplish three purposes.
First, the amendments sought to encourage the bringing
of qui tam actions and promote qui tam filings by increasing the incentives available to relators and by affording
relators greater protection under the Act. Second, the
amendments sought to forge a "partnership" between the
government and the relator by increasing the role of the
relator in prosecuting false claims actions.28 Third, the
amendments modified certain procedural requirements
by clarifying the knowledge required for liability and the
appropriate standard of proof, broadening service of
process and venue under the statute, and including a
tolling provision for the statute of limitations.
Congress expressly recognized the need to "encourage more private enforcement suits" in its passage of
the 1986 amendments. 29 In order to accomplish this goal,
it eliminated the significant bar passed in 1943 that precluded a private cause of action where the government
had any prior knowledge of the fraud. This provision
was perhaps the most far reaching change under the 1986
amendments because it specifically allowed qui tam
actions to be pursued even if a qui tam complaint followed public disclosure of false billings from a criminal,
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civil or administrative hearing, or other public sources.
However, such cases could only be brought where the
relator was an "original source" of the allegations and
had direct and independent knowledge of the fraudulent
30
activity.
Increased financial incentives also encouraged
relators to file qui tam cases. The 1986 Amendments
established a minimum award of 15% (but not more than
25%) if the government intervened in the case. If the
government failed to intervene, the minimum award was
increased to 25% (but not more than 30%).31 In addition,
the civil penalties for relator awards were increased.
First, the penalty for each false claim was raised from
$2,000 per claim to $5,000 to $10,000 per claim. Second,
treble, rather than double, damages were imposed for the
actual loss suffered by the government.32
Also encouraging qui tam filings was the inclusion
of an anti-retaliation cause of action for employees who
filed complaints against their employers (or former
employers). Recognizing that these "whistleblowers"
were often subjected to retaliation or dismissal for reporting suspected fraud, 33 Congress included a new provision in the Act that protected these employees from
retaliation for reporting fraudulent claims or taking
actions in pursuit of a qui tam complaint by allowing
them an independent cause of action under the statute. 34
The second major thrust of the 1986 Amendments,
which was to encourage a new partnership, resulted in a
strengthening of the relator's role in the litigation. As the
Act was originally enacted, after filing the complaint, the
government had the option of intervening and prosecuting the case in place of the relator. The 1986 Amendments
changed the relator's post-intervention role by allowing
the relator to remain in the litigation even if the government intervened in the case. 3 Participation by the relator
after government intervention was also seen as a "check
that the Government does not neglect evidence, cause
unduly delay [sic], or drop the false claims case without
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legitimate reason.

' 36

Although the government could

seek to limit the relator's role after its intervention,37 with
both the Department of Justice and the relator litigating
the case, there would be effectively two law firms representing the government's interest.
The last objective of the 1986 Amendments - to
liberalize the Act's application - was accomplished by
several procedural changes. Before 1986, some courts had
interpreted the False Claims Act requirement that a false
claim be "knowingly" presented to the government.38 By
requiring a specific intent to defraud, the 1986 amendments clarified this standard to allow recovery where the
person defrauding the government acted in deliberate
ignorance of the truth or acted in reckless disregard of the
truth.39
The standard required under most sections of the
Act is that the defendant knows the information is false;
or acts in deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity.40 Congress clearly intended to impose
liability for conduct that was more than merely negligent
but less than intentional. 41 The Senate Committee noted
that it sought to:
strike a balance which is 'designed to assure
the skeptical both that mere negligence could
not be punished by an overzealous agency
and that artful defense counsel could not urge
that the statute actually require some form of
intent as an essential ingredient of proof.'42
Although this standard is sometimes incorrectly referred
to as an "intent" standard, 3 the Act makes clear that "no
specific intent to defraud is required."" Rather, intent
implies some type of voluntary or reckless act taken in
violation of a duty.4s
Liability under the False Claims Act is premised
on knowledge, not intent. Liability is a question of scienter, or knowledge, which the Defendant possesses
about false claims. However, the statute imposes a spe-
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cific duty to inquire about false claims. Congress made
clear that liability standard included those who have:
actual knowledge that the claim is false,
fictitious, or fraudulent, or acts in gross
negligence of the duty to make such inquiry
as would be reasonable and prudent to
conduct under the circumstances to ascertain the true and accurate basis of the
claim. 46
Accordingly, Congress specifically wanted to
include the situation where "an individual 'buried his
head in the sand' and failed to make simple inquiries
which would alert him that false claims are being submitted." 47 Because of the duty to make an affirmative inquiry
imposed under the law, although Congress referred to the
liability for "who know or have reason to know" that a
claim is false, 48 liability under the False Claims Act is
more accurately imposes liability for those "who know or
could have reason to know" that a claim is false.
Congress also clarified that in order to prevail on a
False Claims Act claim, the fraud must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.49 Courts had previously
imposed varying standards of proof by "clear and convincing evidence" or even the functional equivalent of a
standard similar to "beyond a reasonable doubt." 0
Congress also liberalized venue for False Claims
Act cases. As originally enacted (and unchanged by the
1943 amendments), the Act allowed a defendant to be
sued within a district where "the person doing or committing such act shall be found wheresoever such act may
have been done or committed."5 ' In response to government concerns that cases would have to be filed in separate districts against multiple defendants, the venue
provisions were broadened to allow an action "in the
judicial district where any defendant can be found, resides, transacts business, or in which any act alleged as a
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violation is alleged to have occurred." 2 In other words,
even if one of the defendants committed only one act in a
district, venue was proper. The 1986 Amendments also
provided for international service of process, 3 national
service of trial, and hearing subpoenas.-4 Finally, the
Amendments extended the statute of limitations from
"six years from the doing or committing of the act," 5 to
include a tolling provision which would extend liability
to as long as ten years. 6
As outlined above, the standard for liability under
the Act makes it clear that it is not a fraud statute to
which common law fraud principles apply. Instead, it is a
false claim or false statement statute57 that, as shown
below, has procedural standards that place the relator
and his or her attorney in the position of private government prosecutor, a unique position in American jurisprudence.
PROCEDURE REMAINS UNALTERED UNDER THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Since 1986, the Act's primary provisions and
procedure remain unchanged despite being amended. A
relator who has information about the submission of false
or fraudulent claims to the government still files a complaint under seal and serves a copy of the complaint on
the United States Attorney.5 8 As noted above, the relator
is in a unique position in American jurisprudence since
the relator represents his or her own interest, as well as
the government's interest:
Actions by private persons. -(1) A person
may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government. The action shall
be brought in the name of the Government.5 9
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Thus, unlike any other civil action, the relator and
relator's attorney are pursuing two interests - that of the
person filing the complaint and that of the United States.
In addition, a separate retaliation claim or common law
or statutory wrongful discharge claims may be joined
with the action. Thus, the interests of the relator and the
United States, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, are not always harmonious:
That a qui tam suit is brought by a private
party "on behalf of the United
States"... does not alter the fact that a
relator's interests and the Government's do
not necessarily coincide. Moreover, as the
statute specifies, qui tam actions are brought
both "for the person and for the United
60
States Government."
Several types of false claims submitted for payment to the government are actionable under the Act.
The most common are "mischarge" cases in which the
government has been overcharged for a service not
rendered, or charged more than it should have been.
Other types of false claims include the submission of
false statements in contract negotiations, the submission
of false statements to create eligibility for federal programs and supplying substandard services or products.61
In short, almost any action that involves a payment or
demand for payment of government funds may impose
liability under the Act.62
The complaint, which must be accompanied by a
written disclosure of evidence and information possessed
by the relator, is then evaluated by government attorneys
who decide whether or not to intervene in the case. 63
Although the statute requires the government to make its
decision to intervene within sixty days, the government
often seeks extensions and may typically take two or
three years to decide.
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If the government chooses to intervene, the U.S.
Attorney's Office will either attempt to settle the action
or ask that the complaint be sealed. If the complaint is
unsealed, it will be served on the defendant and the
government will have primary responsibility for prosecuting the action. 64 The relator may still participate in
the lawsuit, unless the government seeks to limit the
relator's involvement by court order.65
If the government declines to intervene, the relator
may continue the action on his or her own, while continuing to inform the government of the course of the
litigation. The government may also retain its right to
intervene at a later stage in the case. Regardless of
whether the government decides to intervene, the court
must approve any settlement that is fair and reasonable.66
THE CONSUMER ACTS AS ADVOCATE AND PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN QUI TAM ACTION
The qui tam statute uniquely places the relator in
the position of private attorney general. As such, the
relator and his counsel are only able to determine the
breadth and scope of the investigation based upon the
information they present. In other words, after the case is
filed, the government attorneys effectively take over
investigation of the case based upon information provided by the relator. While the relator and his or her
attorney may focus government efforts in the government investigation, the degree of involvement remains
dependent upon the type of information brought by the
relator and the credibility (and potentially the resources)
the relator and his or her attorney can bring to the investigation. It is therefore necessary that any relator and his
counsel thoroughly and competently investigate the case
and present a complete factual basis of the laws that are
alleged to have been breached, and the damages resulting therefrom.
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The relator's first step in the litigation process is to
supply the government with factual information about
fraudulent billings and fraudulent statements presented
by a private contractor. The relator often acts as an interested third party by providing direct information that
forms the basis of the government's investigation.
A variety of individuals are potential relators
because the False Claims Act contains virtually no restrictions on who may be a relator. Often relators are employees or former employees who have direct knowledge of
fraudulent activity and have complained directly or
indirectly to their company. When the relator and his or
her attorney present a comprehensive and well-founded
factual presentation, the government has a stronger basis
and a stronger inclination to intervene in the case.
It is extremely important that an attorney investigating a qui tam action have sufficient information on
which to build a strong factual case. The attorney must
properly inform the government to fulfill his obligations
under the False Claims Act statute and thoroughly evaluate and complete a presentation of all facts that form the
basis of the claim.
The filing of the complaint begins an investigation
by the U.S. Attorney's office into both civil and criminal
aspects of the complaint, if the facts warrant it. This
means that two attorneys and two investigators may be
simultaneously investigating the case or working in
concert to investigate the case. After filing, the relator's
attorney must bolster the government's case as much as
possible by providing whatever information is required
of the government and by ensuring the complete and
thorough presentation of the factual bases of the relator
which form the cause of action.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPILES STATISTICS
UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Between 1986 and 1997, more than $640 billion
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was lost to fraud by Federal contractors.17 The Department of Justice estimates that as much as $100 billion, or
ten percent of our total annual health care costs, may be
lost each year to fraud and abuse. Medicare - which
serves almost forty million Americans at an annual cost
of over $180 billion - is annually defrauded by contractors of almost $27 billion.68
Since its liberalization in 1986, the False Claims
Act has served as a valuable tool in combating fraud
against the government. As can be expected from the
intent of the 1986 amendments, the Act's initial application focused on the defense industry from 1986 through
1990. Approximately 75% of the qui tam cases filed in that
period were against defense contractors. 69 With the
reduction in defense spending over the past decade,
other recipients of government funding have been the
subject of qui tam actions in recent years, particularly the
health care industry.
Increasingly, qui tam cases are a major factor in
deterring and preventing health care fraud. Health fraud
cases brought under the False Claims Act have increased
at a dramatic rate. Between 1992 and 1996, the number of
government cases brought against health care providers
increased from 199 to 333. During this same time period,
private qui tam cases increased tenfold, rising from 17 to
178.70 Cases involving health care fraud have risen from
12% of all cases filed in 1987 to 61% of all cases filed in
1998.71
From 1986 through the end of fiscal year 1998,
over 2,400 qui tam suits were filed, with the number of
cases increasing steadily each year from 33 cases filed in
fiscal year 1987 to 417 cases filed in fiscal year 1998.
During this same time period, the Department of Justice
intervened in only 337 of the cases and declined to intervene in 1229, with the remainder still under investigation' $625 million was recovered in qui tam cases in 1997
and $331 million was recovered in qui tam cases in 1998.1
In the largest recovery in a civil qui tam case, SmithKline
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Beecham Clinical Laboratories agreed to pay back $325
million to the Treasury for false billings submitted to
Medicare through its clinical labs.74
Government intervention remains the key to
successful resolution of qui tam action. As October 1998,
cases filed by qui tam relators generated $2.085 billion in
moneys recovered and paid into the United States Treasury.7 5 Over 98.%, or $2.027 billion came from cases
where there was government intervention. Non-intervention cases have generated only $58 million of the recoveries paid to the United States.76
CONSUMERS ARE INJURED BY FALSE CLAIMS
Because the health care industry produces the
majority of current qui tam cases, inadequacies within the
health care system are the most common source of injury
to consumers. There is a common misconception that
false billings do not affect the quality or delivery of
health care services. In other words, the only damage that
results from the false billings is money being improperly
taken from the government. In fact, nothing could be
further from the truth. All consumers pay the price for
fraud against the government, particularly health care
fraud: patients pay more in premiums, copayments and
contributions for health insurance and medical services;
businesses are compelled to pay increasing amounts to
provide health care to their employees; and taxpayers
pay more to cover health care expenditures in public
health plans, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The costs
of increased health care are coming directly out of the
consumers' pockets - the American public is in effect
subsidizing that part of the health care industry that
fraudulently bills for services.
Americans pay about $ 1 trillion in health care
costs per year. According to the Department of Justice,
10% of what Americans spend on health care is fraudulently billed in services not rendered, overcharges, dupli-
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cate charges and other health fraud schemes. The result is
that $100 billion per year is fraudulently billed. 77
How much health care can be delivered for $100
billion?
* $100 billion would give every man, woman
and child in the United States and Canada a
complete health examination and physical.
* $100 billion would pay for 20 million days in
an intensive care unit at a hospital.
* $100 billion would pay for 40 million CT scans.
How do higher health costs translate into lower
patient care? Plainly, if there is not enough money to pay
for appropriate patient care, the quality the health service
delivered will go down. If there is not enough money to
pay for the service in the future, the services will not be
provided, particularly to those who can not afford private insurance. Inflated and false billings also serve to
directly diminish the quality of health care that is delivered. Patients are paying more than necessary to receive
adequate health services.
Qui tam cases involve all health care providers:
hospitals, physicians, medical equipment suppliers,
clinics, ambulance companies, clinical laboratories, universities, billing services, therapists, home health care
providers and nursing homes. The lawsuits are generally
brought by employees, doctors, nurses, researchers,
subcontractors, and even competitors.
Health care fraud hurts everyone. It should be
reported, thoroughly investigated and soundly eliminated. The future of our health care system, particularly
our Medicare system, depends on ordinary citizens
stepping forward to get rid of the fraud in health delivery.
CONCLUSION
The False Claims Act has made a dramatic difference in not only recovery of monies for fraud already
committed, but also in deterring fraud by the threat of qui
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tam lawsuits. In a study commissioned by the Taxpayers
Against Fraud, former Senate Budget Committee chief
economist William Stringer estimated that $35 billion of
fraud has been deterred since 1986 by the threat of these
lawsuits.7 8 . This same study projected a deterrence of
over $100 billion over the next ten years.
The future of the statute, however, remains uncertain. The health care industry in particular has pushed
for a series of amendments that would severely weaken
the False Claims Act provisions.7 9 Whether or not the
False Claims Act can withstand this frontal assault may
hold the key to its continued viability as one of the few
avenues for consumers to directly eliminate fraud and
waste.
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tgrande@davislevin.com.
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